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IS "JUST WAR" THEORY JUSTIFIABLE? 1
War ... is only the sad recourse in the state of nature (where there is no
tribunal which could judge with the force of law) by which each state asserts its
right by violence and in which neither party can be adjudged unjust (for that
would presuppose a juridical decision); in lieu of such a decision, the issue of the
conflict (as if given by a so-called "judgment of God") decides on which side
justice lies.... We may well be astonished that the word "law" has not yet been
banished from war politics as pedantic, and that no state has yet been bold
enough to advocate [this banishment]. Up to the present, Hugo Grotius,
Pufendorf, Vattel, and many other irritating comforters have been cited in
justification of war, though their code, philosophically or diplomatically
formulated, has not and cannot have the least legal force, because states as such
do not stand under a common external power.
Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace 2
Kant in his essay, Perpetual Peace, takes what seems at first sight to be an extreme
position: The just war theorists are "putting the cart before the horse." There is no sense in
talking about justice or injustice in war, and in fact the phrase, "just war," is a contradiction in
terms in the present world situation. And a common external power, and legal apparatus,
would be necessary to get the "civilized" nations of the world out of their de facto "state of
nature."
One may take exception to an apparent conflation of morality with legality here, as if a

political/legal interrelationship among nations must be in place before we can talk about justice
or morality. In Kant's Rechtsphilosophie, morality is distinct and conceptually prior to the
political/legal relationships. However, Kant is not necessarily departing from that conceptual
analysis here. But even though the conceptual distinction between the legal and the moral
does remain, there seems to be a greater emphasis on temporal simultaneity of the two
aspects than in his Philosophy of Right.
Kant's philosophy of state is generally thought to be far removed from the
Realphilosophie of Thomas Hobbes. But here in characterizing international relations he seems
to take a position analogous to that taken by Hobbes regarding the formation of nation-states.
The analogy becomes clear if we reexamine the Hobbesian myth:
The final cause, end, or design of men (who naturally love liberty, and
dominion over others) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, in
which we see them live in commonwealths, is the foresight of their own
preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting
themselves out from that miserable condition of war which is necessarily
consequent ... to the natural passions of men when there is no visible power to
keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of
their covenants.3
Kant does not accept Hobbes' version of the formation of the state out of the "state of
nature." Nor does he accept Hobbes' merger of justice and morality with a political "leviathan"
and its legal apparatus. But if we extrapolate this state-of-nature theory to the international
level, a convergence of views begins to take place. In fact, Hobbes made such an extrapolation
explicitly:
[Even if] there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in
a condition of war one against another; yet in all times, kings, and persons of
sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies,
and in the state and posture of gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and
their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the
frontiers of their kingdoms; and continual spies upon their neigbours; which is a
posture of war.4
The nations of the world, observes Kant, are in a natural state of war and need, out of a desire
for self-preservation if for no other reason, to establish once and for all the legal/moral/political
institutions which will for the first time establish the possibility of a "just" relationship among
nations. Until that takes place, there is, strictly speaking, no such thing as a "just war." In fact,
even to talk about a long or short, widespread or highly concentrated, "state of peace" is
unrealistic. Because of national sovereignty, coupled with a lack of political organization

among the nations, the people of the world are ineluctably and essentially constituted in a state
of war among themselves, even if there seem to be no overt hostilities between this or that
country.
If one carries this thesis about the pervasive lack of moral/legal/political relationships
among nations too far, the result may be the sort of realism that Michael Walzer in Just and
Unjust Wars opposes, with regard to embarking on war and conduct within war. This is, what
Walzer calls the "Hobbesian" realism, fueled by the insight of anarchy among sovereign
nations, which bases judgements about war purely on pragmatic considerations -- the escape
from fear, the preservation of power, the chances of aggrandizement -- although lip service is
given to "just causes" for entering wars and "moral conduct" in war. Walzer maintains, in
contrast to such realism, that even actions taken in war and diplomacy under the rubric of
"strategy" involve moral or immoral judgements which are latent, and have to be unpacked.
Ethical judgements enter into war, whether we make these explicit or not. But how do we get
beyond relativity in these ethical judgements? Is certainty possible, or is ambiguity inevitable?
He uses Hobbes' theory as a stepping-stone to the satisfactory solution of this problem:
As Hobbes later explained, the names of the virtues and vices are of
"uncertain signification."
For one calleth wisdom, what another calleth fear; and
one cruelty what another justice; one prodigality, what another
magnanimity...etc. And therefore such names can never be true
grounds of any ratiocination.
"Never" -- until the sovereign, who is also the supreme linguistic authority, fixes
the meaning of the moral vocabulary; but in the state of war, "never" without
qualification, because in that state, by definition, no sovereign rules.... War is
only an extreme case of the anarchy of moral meanings. 5
But, Walzer continues, we are not necessarily confined to such Hobbesian strictures.
The anarchy of moral meanings is inevitable only in a Hobbesian context, where sovereignty
begins and ends with the nation state. Unlike Hobbes, Walzer does not look to a monarchical
sovereign for deliverance from the "anarchy of moral meanings"; the fixation of moral
meanings is to be found rather in a rational consensus which could conceivably emerge even
among the citizens of hostile nations.
But if Hobbes sinks too much into realism, doesn't Walzer distance himself from
appropriate realistic considerations? For it seems optimistic in the extreme to hope for any
such international consensus regarding the justice of a particular war -- especially if we look for
this consensus in all the warring parties. The Gulf War is just the most recent example of the
willy-nilly prevalence of moral-meaning anarchy.

3

Numerous books and articles have come out since the Gulf War, examining and
reexamining traditional "Just War" theory. Did the war in the Gulf meet up to the standard
criteria? What about "proportionality"? Was the possible danger to the international
community of a Saddham Hussein and his arsenal serious enough and certain enough to justify
the loss of life of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians and soldiers, in addition to a few
hundred allied casualties -- not to mention the immense property damage and almost 200
billion dollars in debt incurred? Was the threat to national sovereignty sufficient "just cause" to
justify rescuing a nation created a half-century ago by a British official arbitrarily drawing a line
on the map, a nation controlled at present by a dictatorial and often brutal patriarchy? Was
fighting the war really the "last resort," in view of the strategic importance of imminent
weather changes and the imminent Islamic Ramadan season? or should the allies have waited
for six months to see if economic sanctions would take hold? Just what was the "proper
authority" for declaring war in this case? The U. S. Congress did indeed declare war after the U.
S. President had deployed troops and massive amounts of war machinery to the potential war
zone, but the war was fought under nominal United Nations auspices, even though the U.N.
itself is not the sort of political entity that has the authority to declare war against one of its
members. And was there a "right intention," or just the pragmatic motives -- preserving oil
reserves, keeping oil prices down, obviating a possible military threat to allies in the middle
east, etc.?
It is interesting that much of the debate pro and con about these issues is based on
utilitarian thinking, and is caught up in an unavoidable utilitarian weakness -- the difficulty of
projecting unforeseen consequences of actions taken, at the time the actions are taken. But
the main question about Just War theory is not whether it is a utilitarian approach to morality,
but whether it is on a moral level at all.
The very word, "just," implies a moral relationship. But what moral relationship exists -or can exist -- among sovereign states? Do even towns or communities have a moral
relationship to one another? If we were to speak, for example, about the duty of town X to pay
back a debt to town Y, or of town Y to be truthful to town X about events taking place in town Y
-- clearly any obligation or duties would fall upon an individual or individuals within the town,
but not upon the town itself and every individual living in it. Only individuals have duties to
individuals, or rights corresponding to these duties. There is of course a floating concept of
"group responsibility" and/or "group guilt" -- of Americans for slavery, of Germans for the Nazi
holocaust, and so forth -- but in the final analysis all moral responsibility has to be traced back
to some conscious, intending moral agent or agents. In the civilized world, as in the later
periods of the Old Testament, children "shall not be accountable for the sins of their fathers."
If the majority of citizens in a direct democracy mandated a war, any moral
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responsibility for the decision would devolve upon those who voted for the war. But in a
representative democratic-republic, of course, the process of decision-making is too diffuse to
allow meaningful attribution of responsibility to individual citizens. The "buck stops" ordinarily
with a handful of representatives, unless those who voted for the representative had certain
knowledge of his/her forthcoming decisions on war and peace. And since morality is between
individuals, states can only be in a "moral" relationship with each other when the states
themselves are under the control of the majority of individuals within them. This would be a
second-order, one-step-removed moral relationship; and only democracies can enter into it. If
and when that happens, sovereign states would be in the same moral relationship as e.g.
Nevada and California, between whom war is unthinkable, because they are in a moral
relationship and have legal redress.
But it would be a misleading abstraction to take "justice" in a purely moral sense.
Justice implies has a legal as well as a moral connotation. It implies a legal relationship. And
here we come back to Kant's question: What viable legal relationship can exist in a context in
which there is no properly constituted legislative body, enforcement apparatus, and judiciary?
The justices in the World Court in the Hague may come to a unanimous decision, based on
some accepted concepts of international law, concerning the rights or delinquencies of a U.N.
member nation; but most decisions are without effect, due to a lack of consensus about
enforcement or to the immense power of some delinquent nation which refuses to accept the
Court's judgement. The refusal of the U. S. in the mid-80s to desist from the blockade of
Nicaragua is just one instance of the lack of sanctions associated with World Court decisions.
But even if the Court were associated with an executive branch that could enforce its decisions,
is it conceivable that it could grant legality to some specific war, and declare another war
illegal? This would be like the Federal Government in the U. S. declaring that the state of
California had the right of warring against the state of Nevada to settle a water-rights dispute -in effect, to legalize lawlessness. If California were to secede from the Union because of some
such dispute, this would automatically create a situation of war; but California could not
declare it "just" because they are outside of the only legal system of justice that pertains to this
state, and the Supreme Court could not declare it "just" because the state would be outside the
parameters of its legal jurisdiction. We may justifiably begin to suspect that the concept of a
"legal war" is a contradiction in terms.
Our concept of "war" is just as flawed as the concept of "justice." It implies that there is
some rather persistent state of peace, occasionally or frequently interrupted by war. For
example, during the heyday of the Soviet Union, the U.S. used to contrast the periods of
"detente" with the period of the "cold war", and develop strategies for avoiding a
thermonuclear war or even a local tactical conflict in NATO countries. But even in the stages of
detente, and even now in the post-detente era, we and the Russians have thousands of
5

missiles, capable of obliterating national targets, aimed at each other. Can anyone speak of
peace in such a situation? If two armies were facing each other with weapons poised and
pointed in a classical battlefield, no theorist calling this "peace" could escape ridicule. Of
course, the U.S. and the former Soviet Union are now in the process of re-aiming the missiles at
the ocean -- but this simply makes it more difficult to launch a sudden attack. It seems that the
great spatial and temporal distances involved defuse the threatening nature of what is
happening in the world. If a group of radicals or disgruntled soldiers were mobilizing for a coup
d'état, we would see this as a warlike situation; but if dictators or terrorists on the other side of
the globe are slowly and methodically gathering together the materials for developing nuclear
or chemical or biological weaponry to attack specific enemies, we consider ourselves to be in a
state of "peace" unless and until they actually begin to deploy their weaponry against us or our
allies.
What, then -- is it a mistake to talk about "areas of peace" and "stages of peace" in the
present world situation? Strictly speaking, it is a mistake. And here we come to the
fundamental problem: On the international level, we are living in that classical "state of
nature" theorized by Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes of course was referring to a reconstructed
intranational process -- the formation of states and nations; and there is considerable doubt
whether there is any truth to his hypothesis of an original state in which our ancestors were
fierce and brutish and there was a "war of all against all" leading as a last resort to the
formation of a state "leviathan" to keep order and protect life and property. Rousseau's "state
of nature" theory, which hypothesizes a very different, kind and altruistic ancestor-type, may
be just as plausible. We await further anthropological evidence as to the true historical
situation, which may turn out to be something between these two extremes.
But if we apply Hobbes theory to the international scene, it is certainly correct: Between
nations there is indeed a Hobbesian "state of nature," in which the strong prey on the weak,
and rights to resources and territory and even to continued existence as a nation are
continually threatened, unless massive military counterforce potentials have been built up to
resist potential threats. The nations of the world, like the denizens of Hobbes' hypothetical
"state of nature," are indeed engaged in an ongoing "war of all against all," simply because they
have not yet organized for mutual security into an international political/legal/moral
relationship.
Steps in the direction of such a relationship have no doubt been made, just as the
Hobbesian "natural man" would presumably have proceeded in a series of stages to create the
political structures which would bring them out of the dreaded state of nature. On the
international level, we may optimistically interpret the U.N., the European parliament and the
Common Market, NAFTA and other regional unions as gradual movements towards a more
comprehensive union, or more comprehensive pluralistic unions. But we do not need hard
6

anthropological evidence to convince us that we are still a long way from the final stages of
international organization. And the question we must deal with is, in Hobbesian terms, how do
we get out of this "state of nature" which is synonymous with a state of war, and rise to the
sole moral/legal/political relationship which can be synonymous with the state of peace?
Let us consider the Hobbesian analogy a little further: The individuals victimized by
their "state of nature" are driven by the instinct of self-preservation eventually towards the
creation of a state. If there are any natural laws applicable to human nature, certainly the law
of self-preservation is the most fundamental, since it has to do with simple continuance in
existence. With sociobiological findings in mind, we might add that the drive for selfpreservation would also extend in varying degrees to one's family and kinsfolk and immediate
community. In any case, no "categorical imperative" or "principle of utility" or "good reasons
theory" is necessary to explain and justify actions here. If there are any "natural rights", prior
to any legal system of natural rights, self-preservation is no doubt the most primordial natural
right (judicious application of "Occkam's razor" would probably require, however, that we
refrain from tracing self-preserving actions to a source in rights, and simply explain them as
instincts or drives). Certainly this is a case where the "is" and the "ought" are so inseparably
intertwined that no meaningful distinction between fact and value, what is and what ought to
be, is feasible. The preservation of property, as necessary for continued existence, is also be
included implicitly in the "drive for self-preservation," although no precise definitions of
"property" would be forthcoming in this pre-legal state of affairs. Certainly the land one has
been working on, tools, goods produced, etc. would also be included in the rubric, "property."
With the advent of democratic forms of government, human rights are now guaranteed
in many countries, and the guarantees are often very specific about inclusions and exclusions.
If the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Rights were bolstered by an effective judiciary
and by executive sanctions, we could say that we are well beyond a Hobbesian "state of nature"
in that sphere. But this is certainly not the case. Individuals may have rights guaranteed within
their own national boundaries, but in the international sphere they have only shadow rights.
Thus it is overly optimistic and euphemistic to talk about the "rights" of Chinese dissidents or
Palestinian migrant workers in Kuwait or Kurds in Iraq, or Muslims in Bosnia. If they had rights
on the international scene, they would have access to redress, including political and legal
redress. But all they have is what Hobbes theorized our pre-political ancestors to have: a
natural tendency to combine to defend themselves against threats to their existence and
property.
Continuing the analogy: In this international "state of nature" individuals would be led
by self-interest itself (not necessarily by altruism or "fellow-feeling") to protect and promote
the interests of others who are similarly disposed to overcome global threats to selfpreservation. Some of these supportive individuals would be dwelling in states officially
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recognizing human rights, others would be scattered in states with little or no recognition of
individual rights. Presumably -- if we can unpack the Hobbesian myth a little further -- the
individuals would take some intermediate steps to adopt strategies and create organizations
which would eventually lead to the creation of an international "leviathan" that could offer
comprehensive protection of the rights of all individuals. (In deference to realism, we would
also have to presuppose that some, probably many, individuals would combine during these
processes to assault and exploit others more effectively.)
It would be difficult to produce precise and universally acceptable definitions of
democratic and nondemocratic states, progressive and oppressive states. But -- like
pornography -- we can probably recognize the two extremes reasonably well even if we can't
define them. Under the umbrella term, "democratic," we commonly include states largely
oriented towards protection of individual rights and property, and designate as
"nondemocratic" states formed to preserve the power of a select few or even a single autocrat
over others and their property. In line with this distinction we may surmise that individuals in
democratically-oriented states tend, out of self-interest, if nothing else, to combine to protect
individuals in similarly oriented states, and would have qualms about furthering the interests of
oppressive states. But it would be premature to speak of a moral duty or even a moral right to
do so. No "Just War" theory is necessary to explain such combinations of democratic states.
But this does not mean that there is no moral obligation in this respect; it only means
that the moral obligation is more fundamental and more subtle -- namely, to establish a moral
relationship that is not yet in place. By analogy, if we were to ask if there was anything like a
moral imperative for the Hobbesian denizens prior to their creation of political/moral
institutions, the prime candidate for this honor would be the imperative to ... rise to the moral
level, and establish moral relations. Certainly the most fundamental, but often implicit, moral
choice is the choice to establish oneself in a moral relationship to others and act morally. This
is a choice that many may be presumed to have made with a view to their own society or
culture, but few with a view to mankind without qualification.
In the international sphere, the analogous fundamental imperative would be for
establishing an international federation, with legislative, executive and judicial functions.
Presumably this would be inaugurated with a nucleus of democratic states which have made
considerable progress in human-rights matters. If and when such a federation is established,
the moral relationship would not be between sovereign states, which are not capable of moral
relationships, but between individuals; and military interventions by states would have to be
agreed to by the majority of their citizenry, and on behalf of citizens in other states. (This is not
to say that a majority decision is automatically moral; but that for a decision to be judged moral
or immoral, it has to be traceable to individual moral agents.) A corollary extension of the
incipient moral relationship would be intermittent, ad hoc assistance to democratic factions in
8

undemocratic states, where feasible.
Those trying to apply Just War theory to the Gulf war will never be able to come to a
consensus pro or con about the "moral justifiability" of the war. There were obviously mixed
intentions, as in any war; more than in many wars the distinction between combatants and
noncombatants was continually fuzzy; and the final consequences are still not apparent for
those who would like to invoke utilitarian principles. If Just War theory were applicable, it is
conceivable that Saddham Hussein could also invoke it in his own favor. As grounds, there is
not just the moot point about past history in the assignment of territorial borders to Iraq, but a
host of other issues offering prima facie justification for Iraq's campaign against Kuwait:
Kuwait's insistence on Iraqi payment of debts incurred in Iraq's war against Iran -- a war which
was in the interests of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia; Kuwaiti incursion into Iraqi oil fields prior to the
war; Kuwaiti exploitation of Iraqi currency-devaluation after the war with Iran; a possible
"green light" given for the attack on Kuwait by a U. S. ambassador some months prior to the
mobilization of Iraq; and -- a matter certainly not fully appreciated by Western powers -- the
internal middle-eastern conflict of Pan-Arabism (over which Hussein might have been able to
assume the leadership) against Islamic fundamentalism.
Humanitarian intervention to protect human rights would be in the Hobbesian selfinterest of democratic peoples everywhere. But intervention to protect the rights of those who
are indifferent to, or oppressive of, the rights of others, is inconsistent and counterproductive,
to say the least. The Gulf War was uncomfortably murky in this respect, and this is no doubt
the major reason for the current irresolvable disputes concerning conformity to Just War
theory.
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